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Abstract. Equal and proportional representation are two poles of a continuum of models of representation 
for the assembly of a federation of states.  The choice of a model has repercussions on the welfare distribu-
tion in the federation. We determine, first by means of Monte Carlo simulations, what welfare distributions 
result after assemblies that were constituted on the basis of different models of representation have consid-
ered a large number of motions.  We assess what model of representation is favored by a Rawlsian maxi-
min measure and by the utilitarian measure and present matching analytical results for the utilitarian meas-
ure for a slightly idealized case.  Our results show that degressive proportionality can be justified as a com-
promise between maximin and utilitarian considerations.  There is little surprise in this result.  What is 
more surprising, however, is that, within certain contexts of evaluation, degressive proportionality can also 
be justified on strictly utilitarian grounds.    
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Introduction.  A federal assembly consists of a number of representatives for each of the nations (states, 
Länder, cantons...) that make up the federation.  In determining the constitution of such an assembly there 
is the following tension.  On the one hand, we may think of the federation as a federation of nation states.  
This would support a model of equal representation, i.e. a model in which each nation has the same number 
of representatives.  On the other hand, we may think of the federation as a federation of people.  This would 
support a model of proportional representation, i.e. a model in which the number of representatives for a 
nation is proportional to the number of its inhabitants.  But presumably that is not the only motivation.  
What makes this issue worth quibbling about is that the model of representation that is instituted will have 
an impact on the welfare distribution over the nations in the federation that will ensue over due course.  
Welfare distributions can be evaluated on various measures that correspond to conceptions of justice.  We 
will investigate what models of representation yield welfare distributions that score higher on the Rawlsian 
maximin measure and on the utilitarian measure.  First, we construct a continuum of models of representa-
tion ranging from equal to proportional representation.  In between these extremes are models of degressive 
proportionality.  On such models, the larger nations receive more representatives, but less than would be 
warranted by proportionality, whereas the smaller nations receive less representatives, but more than would 
be warranted by proportionality.  We take the European Union as a paradigm case of a federation.  We run 
a Monte-Carlo simulation in which a large number of motions are voted up or down within varying con-
texts of evaluation and investigate how well the resulting welfare distributions score on the Rawlsian 
maximin and on the utilitarian measures.  Simulation results give us more leeway in specifying values for 
the parameters in the model, but they do not provide complete insight in the functional dependences of the 
measures on these parameters.  We will provide analytical results for the utilitarian measure for a slightly 
idealized case.  
Our study deals with a question in voting theory and theories of justice that has direct relevance to 
today’s political world.  With the increase in autonomous nation states across the world comes the need to 
design institutions for transnational political structures that are responsive to certain conceptions of justice.  
With the projected extension of the European Union, there has been much discussion about how the various 
nations should be represented in the Council of the European Union.  The Swedish proposal was for the 
number of representatives to be proportional to the square root of the population.  This is a model of de-
gressive proportionality.  The French president responded that he failed to see what was politically signifi-
cant about the square root.  The question is of course what justification can be advanced for models of de-
gressive proportionality.  We will show that degressive proportionality can be justified as a compromise 
between maximin and utilitarian considerations.  There is little surprise in this result.  What is more surpris-
ing, however, is that, within certain contexts of evaluation, it can also be justified on strictly utilitarian 
grounds.  We end with some suggestions about how our model could be made operational for empirical 
work.      
   
1.  The Federation, its Constituent Nations and Models of Representation.   
Let there be a federation that has a total population of S people.  It is divided into N nations, some of them 
larger, some of them smaller.  Each nation i has a population size of si.  The federal assembly is the deci-
sion-making organ for the federation.  Our model can be readily generalized, but just to have some definite 
numbers, we will run our simulations with the actual population sizes of the European Union (see Table 1) 
and with the actual number of representatives in the Council of the European Union.   
To represent the continuum between equal representation and proportional representation in the 
assembly, we construct the following measure, which determines the proportion of representatives of nation 
i in the assembly: 
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α is a measure of the degree of proportionality.  ri(0) = 1/N and there is equal representation in the assem-
bly.  ri(1) = xi and there is proportional representation in the assembly.1  Intermediate values of α represent 
models of representation of degressive proportionality that are located on the continuum between both ex-
tremes.  For example, α = ½ corresponds to the Swedish proposal.  Obviously, ∑
=
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= 1 for any value of α. 
How can we turn ratios of representatives into actual whole numbers of representatives for assem-
blies of particular sizes?  This is a complex question in voting theory, but for our purposes the following 
simple system suffices.  There are currently N = 15 nations in the European Union and T = 87 representa-
tives in the Council of the European Union.  To determine the number of representative for each nation i 
we multiply T with the ratio ri(α).  We assign, in a first step, [ri(α)T]—i.e. the whole number smaller than 
or equal to ri(α)T—representatives to each nation i.  The number of remaining seats is k(α) = T – 
∑
=
α
N
i Tr
1i
])([ .  Clearly k(α) < N.  These k(α) seats are distributed as follows.  We order the nations ac-
cording to the relative sizes of the decimal parts ri(α)T – [ri(α)T], going from larger to smaller.  We now 
assign to each of the first k(α) nations in this ordering precisely one additional seat.  Let Ri(α) be the num-
ber of seats that each nation i receives in the assembly on the proportionality measure α. 
 
2.  Voting on Motions.  
A motion affects the people of the respective nations in different ways.  A motion to improve the defense of 
the federation may benefit each nation to the same extent.  But a motion to improve the highway system in 
some nation on the periphery of the federation does little more than benefit the nation in question, while it 
constitutes a cost to the other nations.  A motion can be thought off as a utility vector <v1, ..., vi,..., vN> in 
which each vi represents the expected utility that the motion will bring to an arbitrary person of nation i if 
the motion were adopted.   
There is a certain threshold value of utility so that all the representatives of a nation will vote in 
favor of the motion if the utility that this motion will bring to the nation in question exceeds the threshold 
value.  They vote against the motion if the utility drops below the threshold value.  They will abstain if the 
utility equals the threshold value.  Let us say that the threshold value is the point at which the costs balance 
out against the benefits for the nation of question.  Costs and benefits should be understood broadly.  They 
may also reflect feelings of altruism between the nations in question. 
David Hume (1888 [1739]: Book III, Part II, Section II) notoriously believed that questions of jus-
tice only arise if we can expect moderate selfishness (and not benevolence or extreme selfishness) and in 
times of relative scarcity (and not in times of extreme scarcity or abundance). We will not follow Hume’s 
contention as to when questions of justice arise, but his taxonomy comes in handy in distinguishing be-
tween alternative contexts of evaluation:  
(i) Benevolence and Abundance.  In times of economic prosperity, or amongst nations that genuinely care 
about the well being of the other nations, the benefits that nations receive when a motion is adopted tend to 
outweigh the costs more often than not.  There is money enough to go around so that costs matter mini-
mally and there is a positive disposition towards political initiatives in general so that each nation’s utility 
from a motion receives an added bonus.  To model this situation, we let the utility values in the vector that 
represents a motion be random numbers generated under a uniform distribution over the range [-.5, 1] and 
we set the threshold value for acceptance at vt = 0.  Hence, the chance that an arbitrary nation will vote for a 
motion is 2/3.  As a mnemonic aid, let us name this the context of generous voters.  
(ii) Extreme Scarcity and Extreme Selfishness.  In times of economic recession, or amongst nations that are 
strictly concerned with their own welfare, the costs of a motion tend to outweigh the benefits more often 
than not.  The nations are wary of expenditures and they only benefit from the implementation of motions 
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 When α > 1, then the larger nations will get a disproportionately larger representation and the smaller nations a disproportionately 
smaller representation in the federal assembly.  We will restrict α to the closed interval [0,1], but our model can be readily extended to 
such models of representation.     
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in support of projects that directly affect their own welfare.  We let the utility values be random numbers 
generated under a uniform distribution over the range [-1, .5] with vt = 0.  Hence, the chance that an arbi-
trary nation will vote for some motion is 1/3.  This is the context of stingy voters. 
(iii) Moderate Selfishness and Relative Scarcity.  This context is intermediate between the previous two 
poles of the continuum. We let the utility values be random numbers generated under a uniform distribution 
over the range [-1,1] with vt = 0.  The chance that an arbitrary nation will support a motion is 1/2.  This is 
the context of balanced voters. 
Some observations are in order.  First, in our model, the utility values are independent of each 
other.  Alternatively, one could model, say, these contexts by stipulating different degrees of dependency 
between the utility values in a motion.  Positive dependencies hold between nations that are in a close bond 
with one another.  Or it may also be the case that the nations are sensitive to the common good of the fed-
eration.  An extreme case hereof would be that all nations receive the same utility value from all motions.  
We will address the challenge of modeling dependencies in Section 6.  Second, we chose uniform distribu-
tions.  But the distributions do not need to be uniform.  Our analytical results will show that the utilitarian 
measure remains invariant under an alternative choice of distribution as long as we keep a limited set of 
parameters that characterize the distribution fixed.  Third, we vary the range of the utility values and keep 
the threshold values fixed.  Alternatively, one could keep the range fixed and change the threshold value, 
but this does not make any difference to our results.             
 
3.  Evaluating Models of Representation.   
Models of representation in a federal assembly are social arrangements.  Each value of α constitutes an 
alternative social arrangement.  We start with the model of equal representation (α = 0) and increase the 
value of α with increments of ∆α (which we set in our computer simulation at .01) until we reach the 
model of proportional representation (α = 1).  We consider m motions for some sufficiently2 large m, say m 
= 10,000, in our calculations.  That is, we generate m n-dimensional vectors <v1k, ..., vik, ..., vNk> for k = 
1,..., m with  random numbers in the ranges that correspond to the respective contexts of evaluation.  For 
each motion, a vote is taken by an assembly whose constitution is based on a particular value of α.  The 
representatives of a nation i will all vote for a motion if vik exceeds the threshold value vt that we take to be 
same for all nations; they will all vote against the motion if vik is lower than vt; and they will abstain if vik 
equals vt.  If the motion k is accepted, each nation i is assigned a utility value vik.  If the motion is not ac-
cepted, then it is discarded and each nation remains unaffected by the motion.  After the m motions have all 
been considered, we divide the sum of the utilities that each nation has accrued by m: the resulting vector 
u(α) = <u1(α), ..., ui(α), ..., uN(α)> contains the utilities ui(α) that a person in nation i can expect from a 
motion, given a particular model of representation represented by a specific value of the parameter α.  At 
the end of this process we have a vector of utility distributions associated with the values of α, viz. <u(0), 
u(α), u(2α),..., u(1)>, or, more specifically, in our computer simulation, <u(0), u(.01), u(.02), ..., u(1)>. 
In formal terms, ui(α) is constructed as follows.  Let the function3 g(y) equal 1 if y > 0 and 0 if y 
≤  0 and let sign(y) be the standard function in mathematics which equals 1 if y > 0, 0 if y = 0, and –1 if y < 
0.  The decision function Dk(α) yields 1 if the majority supports motion k and 0 if the majority does not 
support this motion: 
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We can now express ui(α), i.e. the expected utility of a motion for nation i, as the sum of the utilities that a 
nation i receives from accepted motions over the numbers of motions considered: 
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 ‘Sufficiently’ means that higher values of m do not change our results.    
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 g is similar to the Heaviside function, except that the Heaviside function is undefined for 0.   
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Following Harsanyi (1976), the model of representation α that is supported by utilitarianism is the model 
that maximizes expected utility.  Hence, the measure that is to be maximized is the sum of the component 
utility values ui(α) in the utility vector u(α) weighted by the respective population proportions xi:   
 
(4) Mutil[u(α)] = ∑
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The model of representation α that maximizes this measure is the social arrangement that is supported by 
the utilitarian conception of justice.   
Following Rawls’s difference principle (or rather, the difference principle substituting utilities for 
primary goods) the distribution which maximizes the minimum expected utility ui(α) of a person in nation i 
is the fairer distribution (1971: 125f.). The measure to be maximized is the minimum utility value in u(α): 
 
(5)  Mmin[u(α)] = Min(ui(α)) with i },...,{ N1∈ . 
 
The model of representation α that maximizes this measure is the social arrangement that is supported by 
the Rawlsian conception of justice.  
 
4.  A Justification for Degressive Proportionality.   
Figure 1 presents the graph for the Rawlsian measure for the context of balanced voters.  This measure 
supports a model of representation in the neighborhood of equal representation.  It behaves in a similar 
manner for generous and stingy voters as for balanced voters except that the values of the measure are 
lower for stingy voters and higher for generous voters (graphs omitted).  Figure 2 presents the graph for the 
utilitarian measure for the context of balanced voters.  This measure supports a model of proportional rep-
resentation within a context of balanced voters.  But surprisingly, Figures 3 and 4 show that, in contexts of 
stingy and of generous voters, the utilitarian measure supports a degressively proportional model of repre-
sentation. 
There are two good reasons why one might favor some degressively proportional model on welfa-
rist grounds. One might defend a welfare distribution that combines utilitarian with Rawlsian considera-
tions.  Independently of the context of voting, striking a balance between these considerations favors a de-
gressively proportional model of representation.  This is not unsurprising.  The Rawlsian measure is moti-
vated by certain egalitarian concerns.  One can only move away from an egalitarian welfare distribution if 
it is the case that introducing some inequality does not make anyone worse off.  If all the nations have an 
equal input in the vote, then the inhabitants of all nations can be expected to end up with equal utility.  But 
if larger nations have a greater input in the vote than smaller nations, then larger nations will outvote 
smaller nations. The welfare levels of larger nations will gain as a consequence, whereas smaller nations 
will be outvoted and their welfare levels will suffer as a consequence.  So the inequality that is introduced 
by allotting larger nations a greater input in the vote does make inhabitants of smaller nations worse off, 
which is not tolerated by a Rawlsian conception of justice.  On the other hand, this inequality will be less of 
a concern for the utilitarian, since the chance of being an inhabitant of a larger nation is greater than the 
chance of being an inhabitant of a smaller nation.  So the inequality may actually increase the expected 
utility and so there is nothing objectionable for the utilitarian in introducing at least some proportionality 
into the constitution of the assembly.  So, in conclusion, if we want to strike a balance between Rawlsian 
and utilitarian considerations, one may reasonable expect that some model of degressive proportionality 
will be favored.     
But how much proportionality can we introduce into the constitution of the assembly and still ex-
pect the expected utility to rise?  What is surprising is that the answer to this question depends on the con-
text of evaluation.  For generous and stingy voters, the expected utility maximizes for some degree of de-
gressive proportionality.  For balanced voters the expected utility maximizes for full proportionality.  As-
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suming that a context of balanced voters is not the norm, it turns out that a strict utilitarian should support 
some model of degressive proportionality, rather than full proportionality.     
 
5.  An Analytical Account.   
We will derive analytical results for the more striking results of our simulation, viz. for the behavior of the 
utilitarian measure.4  The measure Mutil is an expectation, viz. the expected utility E[U] from an arbitrary 
motion.  We will compute this expectation by conditioning on the propositional variables A and C.  The 
variable A equals A when the motion is accepted and ¬ A when the motion is not accepted.  To define the 
variable C, construct all the combinations of i nations voting for the motion and N – i nations voting against 
the motion.  From combinatorial analysis, we know that there are N
N
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variable C equals C1 when all the nations vote for the motion, C2 when all nations except for nation N vote 
for the motion,..., and C2N when all nations vote against the motions.  By the probability calculus, 
 
(6) E[U] = ∑∑
=¬= NC,...,CAA, 21CΑ
E[U|A, C]P(A, C). 
 
Notice that E[U| ¬ A, C] equals 0 for any values of C, since the expected utility of a rejected motion is 0.  
Furthermore, by the chain rule, P(A, C) = P(A|C)P(C).  Hence,  
 
(7) E[U] = ∑
= NC,...,C 21C
E[U|A, C]P(A|C)P(C). 
 
In Table 2 we illustrate this calculation for a federation of two nations named ‘1’ and ‘2’.  Each row lists 
the factors within each term of the sum in (7).  First, let u+ be the utility that a nation derives from an ac-
cepted motion assuming that they voted for the motion.  u+ equals 1/2 for generous and balanced voters 
and 1/4 for stingy voters.  Let u– be the utility that a nation derives from an accepted motion assuming that 
they voted against the motion.  u– equals –1/2 for generous and balanced voters, and –1/4 for stingy voters.  
On row 2 of the table, nation 1 voted for and nation 2 voted against.  Hence, assuming that the motion is 
accepted, the expected utility from this motion is the sum of the u+ and u–, weighted by the population pro-
portions of the respective nations.  Second, the chance that the motion will be accepted depends on the pro-
portion of the representatives in the assembly.  The function g(y) is defined as before, i.e. it equals 1 if y > 0 
and 0 if y ≤  0.  The chance that a motion is accepted equals 1 if a majority supports the motion, i.e. if R1 – 
R2 > 0, and equals 0 if the majority does not support the motion, if i.e. R1 – R2 ≤ 0.  Note that the values of 
Ri are a function of xi and α for i = 1, 2.  Third, let p be the chance that an arbitrary nation will vote for a 
motion.  We have seen before that p equals 1/2 for balanced voters, 2/3 for generous voters and 1/3 for 
stingy voters.  On row 2, the chance that the particular combination of nation 1 voting for and nation 2 vot-
ing against the motion equals p(1 – p).  In the last column we construct the product of these factors on each 
row and on the last row we construct the sum of these products.       
The computational time in constructing a plot for α ∈  [0, 1] can be substantially reduced by as-
suming that the assembly has an infinite number of members, so that we can actually conduct a vote by 
means of the ratios ri(α).  This may seem like an unrealistic idealization, but the fact of the matter is that 
this idealization makes very little difference as long as the assembly is sufficiently large.  We calculate 
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E[U] for stingy, generous and balanced voters in the European Union for α ε [0, 1] and have plotted these 
functions in Figures 5, 6 and 7.5  Note that the function is smoother, i.e. less of a sequence of step func-
tions, than the simulation results in Figures 2, 3 and 4 suggest.  The steps come about due to the relatively 
small size of the Council of the European Union.  In Figure 8 we have simulated the utilitarian measure for 
the European Parliament with 626 representatives.  Notice how this function virtually coincides with the 
function that is represented in Figure 5. This function is calculated with proportions of representatives, 
which is tantamount to calculating the function for an assembly with an infinite number of representatives.    
It is worth noting that the function E[U] is fully determined by the parameters u+, u– and  p for a 
particular federation.  In our simulation we specified a uniform distribution for vi for i = 1,..., N.   But the 
only features of this distribution that are relevant are the probability p that an arbitrary nation will accept a 
motion, the expected utility u– of an accepted motion for a nation that voted against the motion and the ex-
pected utility u+ of an accepted motion for a nation that voted against the motion.  As long as we keep these 
parameters fixed, the particular shape of the distribution is of no consequence for the quantities of interest 
in this paper.     
We can also explain why the function Mutil[u(α)] remains constant for low values of α within each 
context.  The value of Mutil[u(α)] is determined by the values of xi and the values of Ri for i = 1,..., N na-
tions assuming a particular context of evaluation.  For a given federation the values of xi are fixed.  The 
values of Ri are determined by the values of xi and α.   Set the value of α at 0.  As we increase the value of 
α nothing will happen to U(α) unless there is some change in one of the g functions. Let’s return to the 
European Union with N = 15 as an example.  When α equals 0 then the 8 smallest nations can outvote the 7 
largest nations, since they have a majority of representatives.  The lowest value of α for which a change 
occurs in one of the g functions is when there is sufficient degressive proportionality so that the 8 smallest 
nations can no longer outvote the 7 largest nations.  Order the nations according to size so that π(1) refers to 
the smallest nation and π(15) to the largest nation in the European Union.  When α = 0, then g(Rπ(1) + ... + 
Rπ(8) – Rπ(9) - ... – Rπ(15)) = 1.  But as we allow for more proportionality in the system, i.e. as we increase the 
value of α, then g(Rπ(1) + ... + Rπ(8) – Rπ(9) - ... – Rπ(15)) will eventually flip to 0.  For what value of α does 
this change occur?  The change in the g function occurs precisely when Rπ(1) + ... + Rπ(8)  no longer exceeds 
Rπ(9) + ... + Rπ(15).  If the number of representatives is infinite, then Ri equals ri and this condition is equiva-
lent to the condition that αpi
α
pi ++ )()( 81 x....x  no longer exceeds 
α
pi
α
pi ++ )()( 159 x....x .  To find this value we 
solve the following equation for α: 
(7)  αpiαpiαpiαpi ++=++ )()()()( 15981 x....xx....x .   
With the proportional population sizes for the European Union this yields α ≈  .065.  And indeed the func-
tion Mutil[u(α)] is constant roughly over the interval [0, .065] in Figures 1 through 8.  (For finite numbers of 
representatives, the value .065 is only an approximation and this approximation is the more accurate, the 
greater the number of representatives.)  There are also other less perspicuous plateaus in the curve repre-
senting the function Mutil[u(α)] which are due to various combinations of possible coalitions.    
   
6.  Further Questions.  
We have made the simplifying assumption that the utility levels of the various nations in a motion are inde-
pendent and identically distributed variables, that the distribution in question is uniform, and that the 
threshold level for voting for a motion is kept constant across all nations.  To give empirical content to this 
study in institutional design, many of these assumptions will need to be relaxed.  The assumption of inde-
pendence may need to be relaxed.  It may well be the case that a number of nations have common interests 
– e.g. motions dealing with agriculture will often elicit strongly correlated utility levels for Mediterranean 
nations in the EU.  The assumption of identical distribution may have to be relaxed.  It may well be the case 
that some nations tend to benefit more while others benefit less from motions that affect the federation.  
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 The reader will notice that the function E[U] for generous voters equals the function E[U] for stingy voters plus 1/4.  This can be 
proven to be the case by replacing the function g(y) by the Heaviside function and by appealing to the integral representation of the 
Heaviside function, which is a common technique in mathematical physics.  (Proof omitted.)  However, unlike the g function used in 
(2), the Heaviside function is not defined for 0, i.e. when the numbers of votes for the motion equals the numbers of votes against the 
motion.  The theorem does not hold for instance when α = 0 and there is an equal number of nations, since in this case it may be the 
case that the number of representatives voting for the motion equals the number of representatives voting against the motion.    
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The assumption of uniformity may need to be relaxed.  It may well be the case that benefits and cost are 
less weighty for some nations so that a normal distribution with mean at the threshold value and a fairly 
low standard deviation is more characteristic.  And finally, the assumption of a constant threshold level 
may need to be relaxed.  Certain nations may, for example, be more picky and only vote for a motion if 
they stand to benefit substantially.  It is easy to build any of these adjustments into the code of the simula-
tion.  The easiest way to do so is to generate random numbers for the utility values of the nations under a 
multivariate normal distribution.  We can set different bounds and different means for each nation, increase 
or decrease the variance as we want the distribution to be more or less uniform for some nation, and specify 
covariance measures that express a commonality of interests between the nations.  Of course, there is a se-
rious empirical challenge to construct a multivariate normal that characterizes the impact of motions on the 
welfare of the nations in the federation.  But to substitute this multivariate normal in our simulation is 
straightforward.   
An alternative to degressive proportionality is to demand that the motion be approved both by an 
assembly with proportional representation and by an assembly with equal representation.  In the United 
States, the House of Representatives and the Senate approximates this model.  Or one may obtain similar 
results by demanding from a single assembly that the votes of the representatives reflect the majority of the 
population in the federation as well as the majority of the nations.  It is an open question whether there ex-
ists a model of regressive proportionality that yields values on the Rawlsian maximin measure and the utili-
tarian measure with a single majority vote that are Pareto optimal to the values on a double majority vote.  
Is the answer to this question stable across different contexts of evaluations?  Is it stable when we relax the 
assumptions in various ways?  These are some of the questions for future research.   
 9 
   
Figures 
 
20 40 60 80 100
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
 
Fig. 1: The Rawlsian Measure for Balanced Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives 
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 Fig. 2: The Utilitarian Measure for Balanced Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives 
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Fig. 3: The Utilitarian Measure for Generous Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives 
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Fig. 4: The Utilitarian Measure for Stingy Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives  
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Fig. 5: The function E[U] for Balanced Voters for Europe and an Infinite Number of Representatives 
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Fig. 6: The function E[U] for Generous Voters for Europe and an Infinite Number of Representatives 
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Fig. 7: The function E[U] for Stingy Voters for Europe and an Infinite Number of Representatives 
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Fig. 8: The Utilitarian Measure for Balanced Voters for Europe and 626 Representatives   
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Tables 
 
 
Austria 7.9 .0214 
Belgium 10 .0271 
Denmark 5.2 .0141 
Finland 5 .0136 
France 57.2 .1550 
Germany 81.2 .2201 
Greece 10.2 .0276 
Ireland 3.5 .0095 
Italy 57.8 .1566 
Luxembourg .3897 .0011 
Netherlands 15.1 .0409 
Portugal 9.8 .0266 
Spain 39.1 .1060 
Sweden 8.8 .0238 
UK 57.6 .1561 
Total 369 1 
      
Table 1: Population sizes in Millions (Second Column) and Population Proportions (Third Column) of the 
Constituent Nations of the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 E[U|A, Ci] P(A|Ci) P(Ci) ∏  
C1 + + u+x1 + u+x2 g(R1 + R2) p2  
C2 + – u+x1 + u–x2 g(R1 – R2) p(1 – p)  
C3 – + u–x1 + u+x2 g(–R1 + R2) (1 – p)p  
C4 – – u–x1 + u–x2 g(–R1 – R2) (1 – p)2  
 ∑  
 
Table 2:  Construction of the Function E[U] in Equation (7) 
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